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The 21st century has been described as the “century of cities”. By 2030, 70 per cent of 
the world’s population will live in cities, with the most rapid urbanization occurring 
in the developing world. This paper will draw up geographer Ed Soja’s concept of the 
“spatial turn” in social theory to consider how the culture of cities can act as a catalyst 
to innovation and the development of new technologies. In doing so, the paper will 
develop a three-layered approach to culture as: the arts; the way of life of people and 
communities; and the embedded structure underpinning socio-economic relations. It 
will also consider technology at a three-layered element, including devices, practices 
and ‘logics’ of technology, or what the Greeks termed techne. The paper will consider 
recent approaches to urban cultural policy, including cluster development and creative 
cities, and suggest some alternatives, noting that a problem with current approaches is 
that they focus excessively upon production (clusters) or consumption (creative 
cities). It will also consider the development of digital creative industries such as 
games, and the strategies of different cities to develop an innovation culture.  
 
Terry Flew is Professor of Media and Communications, Creative Industries Faculty, 
Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia (t.flew@qut.edu.au) 
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The Century of Cities 
 
The 21st century has been described as being a century of cities; a ‘new metropolitan 
age’ (Isar et. al., 2012: 1) where global, national, regional and local forces coalesce in 
densely populated metropolitan centres. The 2000s saw, for the first time in human 
history, the number of people living in cities exceed the number living outside of 
them, and the number of people living in cities is expected to increase from 3 billion 
in the early 2000s to 5 billion people, or 70% of the world’s population, by 2030, with 
the urban populations of the developing world being four times as large as those in the 
more economically developed countries (Worldwatch Institute, 2007).  
 
It has also been argued that cities, and associated city-regions, have become the 
‘motors of the global economy’, and that the shift from manufacturing industries to 
knowledge, service and creative industries are integrally linked to such trends (Scott, 
2008). Scott sees the ‘resurgent city’ of the early 21st century as being connected to 
the rise of information-based industries, advanced services and creative industries that 
have been on the rise in the global economy. People are moving on an unprecedented 
scale, from the countryside to the city and from one country to another: migrants to a 
new country more often than not settle in its major cities, and cities are also the 
primary destinations for tourists, students, business people and others who travel for 
work, leisure or education. The globalization of industry, finance and services makes 
the location of corporate headquarters an increasingly important decision, and much 
of global capital continues to cluster in what Castells (1996), Sassen (2001), Taylor 
(2004) and Friedmann (2006) have identified as world cities. World cities are 
structured as ‘networks of urban places that are arranged hierarchically in terms of 
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their relative importance as sites of corporate control’ (Timberlake and Ma, 2007: 
265): proxy measures for network density include the amount of traffic over 
communications networks, or the number of flights per day from international 
airports.  
 
There is much, then, to support Ash Amin’s observation that globalization, the rise of 
information-based industries, and networked ICTs promote the further development 
and expansion of cities: 
 
There appears little evidence to support the claim that cities are becoming less 
important in an economy marked by increasing geographical dispersal … 
[they] assert, one way or another, the powers of agglomeration, proximity, and 
density, now perhaps less significant for the production of mass manufactures 
than for the production of knowledge, information and innovation, as well as 
specialized inputs … in terms of the territorial base of the economy, there can 
be no question that the city remains the economic motor of postindustrial 
society (Amin, 2000: 120).  
 
Isar et. al. connect this to a shifting set of spatialized power relations, where it is 
cities, rather than nations, that are becoming the ‘leading loci of cultural policy and 
governance’ (2012: 2). In line with authors such as Castells (1996), Held et. al. 
(1999), Sassen (2001) and Taylor (2004), Isar et. al. identify cities as increasingly 
central global political-economic forces in their own right. This challenges the state-
centric logic of 20th century political economy, where it was the nation-state, the 
national economy and national culture that were central, and which exerted leadership 
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both over sub-national levels such as those of cities and regions, and within a global 
system that was understood as a system of states. In the 21st century, this traditional 
hierarchical pattern with the nation-state at the centre of links between the local and 
the global has been challenged by a networked relational model where power is 
increasingly ‘shared and brokered’ (Held et. al., 1999) between the global, national 
and city-regional levels.  
 
In this paper, I will argue that cities can be incubators of an innovation culture and the 
development of new technologies. In order to do this, I will argue that both culture 
and technology need to be understood in a deeper, more structural sense than their 
‘common sense’ definitions would typically allow for. I will finally consider some 
implications for policy-makers and governments in seeking to develop an innovation 
culture in cities, using the concept of social network markets.  
 
Culture and Technology 
 
My key proposition in the first part of this paper will be to argue that technologies and 
socially shaped, and that there is a vitally important cultural dimension to the social 
shaping of technology. What is known in the academic literature as the social shaping 
of technology approach has argued for the need to analyse ‘the socio-economic 
patterns embedded in both the content of technologies and the processes of inno-
vation’ (Williams & Edge 1996: 866). The philosopher of technology Andrew 
Feenberg has argued that ‘Technological development is constrained by cultural 
norms originating in economics, ideology, religion, and tradition’ We are typically 
oblivious to this, since it is taken as given that there is an underlying technological 
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rationality, or what Feenberg terms a ‘technical code … [that] is effectively 
incorporated into the structure of machines’ (Feenberg 2003: 657, 658). Picking up on 
Feenberg’s critical theory of technology, David Sholle has argued that ‘technologies 
are … processes that structure the world in particular ways … we should not see 
technology and the social as separate domains’ (Sholle, 2002: 6). Sholle also proposes 
that: 
   
A technology such as the computer is a product of social processes from the 
beginning. The particular construction of knowledge in institutions of science 
and engineering, the economic interests of companies, the cultural patterns of 
consumption, the spatial arrangements of communities and nations, the 
political motifs of government policies are inscribed into the technology from 
the very beginning (Sholle, 2002: 7). 
 
In order to better comprehend this relationship between technology and culture, we 
need to think about both as operating at three levels: 
 
• A common sense level, as articulated in current government policies as well as 
in everyday discourse; 
• A level of social practice, where both culture and technology are embedded in 
particular ways of doing thing, as well as in social organization; 
• A deep structural level, where both cultural and technological forces operate 
in ways that we are not conscious of in our everyday lives, and which are not 
apparent to policy-makers and other key decision-makers. 
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One of the reasons why we find it difficult to think about culture and technology 
together has been the bracketing off of the arts on the one hand, and the sciences on 
the other, as separate knowledge domains. In the university sector, for instance, there 
is reference to the HASS sector (Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences) and to the 
STEM sector (Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics), and the two are 
seen as competitors for students, resources, claims to knowledge, and the attention of 
policy-makers. This was also the thesis originally put forward by the British scientist 
C. P. Snow in his 1959 Cambridge lecture “The Two Cultures”, where he argued that 
the divide in intellectual life between the sciences and engineering on the one hand, 
and the arts and humanities on the other, had acted as a limiting factor upon solving 
the world’s problems – the two cultures actually needed each other more than either 




Even if we understand culture as primarily associated with the arts (creative, 
performing, visual) and literature, there are many ways in which these areas 
contribute to innovation. In their work for the Council of the Humanities, Arts and 
Social Sciences (CHASS) in Australia, Haseman and Jaaniste (2008) identified six 
arguments that have been made about the contribution of the arts to a national 
innovation system: 
 
1. the cultural argument: the arts create and promote an atmosphere of 
innovation; 
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2. the skills argument: a rich and immersive arts education builds the skills 
required of a future innovative workforce; 
3. the knowledge argument: the arts create new knowledge for innovation 
through creative production and processes, including collaborations with other 
disciplines, such as science, within and beyond universities; 
4. the commercialisation argument: the arts can convert new knowledge and 
research into profits through entrepreneurial activity; 
5. the economic argument: the arts, as part of the creative industries, occupy a 
substantial, growing, enabling and innovative part of the economy; 
6. the systems argument: the cultural sector is an innovation system within which 
various institutions and organisations behave as innovation hubs. 
 
With the increased discussion in recent years of the importance of design to the 
competitiveness of all industries, and the practical case study of the rise of Apple to 
be the world’s most valuable corporation and the vital importance of product design 
to its success, such propositions are perhaps more widely accepted than they once 
were. Certainly, the rise of creative industries debates throughout the world in recent 
years has testified to the new opportunities that have been identified to bring together 
cultural practices and scientific practices based around the affordances of digital 
media technologies (Mitchell et. al., 2003; Flew, 2012).  
 
There is also a second, more anthropological definition of culture as the whole way of 
life, or the forms of lived experience, of people, communities, and social groups. Such 
an expanded definition of culture draws attention to the significance of forms of 
communication, social relations, and practices of everyday life to an understanding of 
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culture. This anthropological approach to culture been a characteristic of cultural 
studies, whjich has drawn upon the definition of culture developed by Raymond 
Williams in his 1965 book The Long Revolution: 
 
Culture is the description of a particular way of life, which expresses certain 
meanings and values not only in art and learning but also in institutions and 
ordinary behavior … Such analysis will … include analysis of elements in the 
way of life that to followers of the other definitions are not ‘culture’ at all; the 
organization of production, the structure of the family, the structure of 
institutions which express or govern social relationships, the characteristic 
forms through which members of the society communicate (Williams, 1965: 
57–58). 
 
Cultural studies, then, is concerned with ‘the study of the entire range of a society’s 
arts, beliefs, institutions, and communicative practices’ (Grossberg et. al., 1992: 4). 
The study of media technologies and media practices has been a particularly 
important element of this, recognizing the centrality of mass media to the formation 
of contemporary cultures. Observing the risk that this could entail ‘the study of 
everything’, Grossberg et. al. also noted a tension in the field between ‘its tendencies 
to embrace both a broad, anthropological and a more narrowly humanistic conception 
of culture’ (Grossberg et. al., 1992: 4).  
 
But the tendency to expand the study of culture out into the study of everything is not 
simply the result of being overly ambitious or naïve. It is also reflective of the third 
element of culture as embedded in deep structures that have considerable historical 
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continuity over time. Language is the clearest example of such a structure: it is always 
subject to change, but those changes occur within the constraints of an overall 
structural system with its own rules that has a long history. The structural conception 
of culture ‘emphasizes both the symbolic character of cultural phenomena and the 
fact that such phenomena are always embedded in structured social contexts’ 
(Thompson, 1991: 136).  
 
Within a structural approach to culture, we need to identify those shifts within a 
culture that have the longest lasting implications. An obvious example would be how 
we communicate, particularly if we recognize, that a cultural approach to 
communication requires us to understand how we communicate as involving not 
simply the sending and receiving of messages (the transmission model), but rather ‘a 
symbolic process whereby reality is produced, maintained, repaired, or transformed’ 
(Carey, 1992: 23). The acquiring of mass literacy, or the ability of whole populations 
not only to speak but also to read and write, constitutes such a historical moment, and 
was one that particularly preoccupied early cultural studies theorists such as Raymond 
Williams. The development of mass communications media has been another, with its 
structural separation of sender and receiver, and the ability to transmit messages 
across both time and space. The development of the Internet and digital media 
technologies, which blur lines between the producers and consumers of media, 
between one-to-one (individual) and many-to-many (social) communication, and 






As with culture, we can identify a three-fold structure to technology, consisting of the 
technological devices themselves, the content and practices associated with these 
technologies, and their wider impact on socio-economic structures and forms of 
organization. In their work on the social shaping of technology, MacKenzie and 
Wacjman (1999) made the point that the common sense definition of technology 
refers primarily to hardware or artefacts. This definition understands technology as 
the tools we use to transform nature, enable social interaction, or extend human 
capacities. The smart phone, tablet device or laptop computer, for instance, are all 
such technological devices.   
 
But this definition of technology as devices or ‘hardware’ needs to be accompanied 
by an understanding of the uses to which technologies are put, or their contexts of use, 
as well as the systems of knowledge and social meaning that accompany their 
development and use. Lievrouw and Livingstone (2005: 2) refer, in the context of new 
media, to ‘the activities and practices in which people engage to communicate or 
share information; and the social arrangements or organizational forms that develop 
around those devices and practices’. Once we incorporate this second element of 
practice or use into our discussion of technologies, it is apparent that we can no longer 
talk about technologies in isolation from other social, cultural, economic and political 




There is a third, structural dimension to technologies that is difficult to capture in the 
English language, as technology tends to be associated with devices or things. It refers 
to the ways in which the generalization of particular technological forms over time 
contains within it implicit forms of social organization that are difficult to reverse. As 
the economist Robert Heilbroner (2003) observed, the nature of the factory system 
promoted hierarchy, not simply because the owners of factories wanted control over 
their work force, but because the optimal functioning of the machines themselves 
necessitated organizing the workplace in hierarchical ways. More recently, the 
sociologist Manuel Castells (1996) has proposed that the network society is a social 
morphology of our times, in that the optimal functioning of ICT networks brings with 
it certain corollaries, such as the need for openness, the decentralized nature of 
information within networks, their propensity for geographical spread, and the need 
for a common code that enables interconnectedness. The fact that the Internet came to 
be based around a common set of shared network protocols was in part a historical 
accident, but the fact that it was has generated a degree of ‘lock in’ about the logic of 
networked organization.  Such a three dimensional understanding of technology is 
better captured in the French la technique and the German die Technik; these terms 
convey a meaning of technology that is closer to the origins of the word ‘technology’ 
in Ancient Greek, as combining techne, or practical or applied arts and skills, and 
logos, or systematic reason, knowledge, or discourse.  
 
Cities, Innovation and Social Network Markets 
 
Cities have been at the core of globalization processes for much of human history, 
from the peak of the Roman Empire in the third century AD to the present day. 
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Timberlake and Ma (2007) identify three reasons why cities are central to 
globalization. First, large cities are typically cosmopolitan places, with diverse 
populations from many other places in the world, and visited and experienced by 
people from all over the world. Second, cities typically exert considerable influence 
over the regions surrounding them, whether through the pull they exert over 
populations from rural areas and smaller towns as centres of economic opportunity, or 
through their role as administrative centres for corporations, governments and other 
institutions, which makes them concentrated sites of economic, political and cultural 
power. Finally, cities exist within a ‘global system of cities’, where there are 
hierarchies between the most influential, intermediate and smaller cities, which are 
connected into ‘networks which span regions of various size … these networks are 
defined by the flows of people, information and things, such as commodities, among 
cities’ (Timberlake and Ma, 2007: 255). 
 
One feature of successful clusters is their combination of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
infrastructure. Landry (2000: 133) observes that while the ‘hard infrastructure’ 
includes buildings, institutions, transport facilities, communications infrastructure 
etc., the less tangible and more place-specific ‘soft infrastructure’ includes ‘the 
system of associative structures and social networks, connections and human 
interactions, that underpins and encourages the flow of ideas between individuals and 
institutions’.  
 
In a global media industry ‘characterized from a geographical point of view by a 
heavy concentration in a limited number of cities, where large media clusters have 
emerged’ (Karlsson and Picard, 2011: 3), Hollywood represents the archetypal 
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creative media cluster. Drawing upon Lorenzen and Frederiksen (2008), we can 
identify it as possessing three types of innovation economies: 
 
1. Localization economies, where externalities derive from the co-location of 
firms in related industries, meaning that they develop associated 
specializations of labour markets and associated institutions (e.g. government 
support agencies, universities and educational institutions) – these are industry 
clusters of the classic sort first identified by Alfred Marshall; 
2. Urbanization economies, arising from a diverse spread of firms and industries 
in a particular location, which generate a diverse range of labour, skills, 
knowledge and ideas, as well as concentrated investment in large-scale 
infrastructure (particularly related to transport, communication, and 
education), the incentives for professional services to cluster in large cities, 
and the attractiveness of cities as sites for migration; 
3. Global city economies, whereby radical product innovation can acquire 
support due to the depth of institutional and investor support, the search for 
novelty and new experiences, and links to sources of both political and 
economic power. In the creative industries, global cities such as New York, 
London, Los Angeles, Paris and Tokyo are both the headquarters for major 
corporate conglomerates, and major sites for the arts and entertainment, 
including the critical avant garde.  
 
The rise of creative clusters is indicative of the ‘tight interweaving of place and 
production system’ (Scott, 2008: 94), that is characteristic of the cultural economy of 
the creative industries. But it varies from place to place, and there is evidence that it 
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tends to scale up i.e. the larger a city, the more innovations per resident it tends to 
develop (Florida, 2007: xvii-xxvi). Lorenzen and Frederiksen identify different 
capacities for innovation in these clusters, from the incremental innovations that 
characterize industrial districts which draw upon localization economies, to the 
radical product innovations that typically arise out of global cities. In her account of 
the cultural economy of New York City, Currid identified how this was different for 
the cultural economy to the industrial economy, since this ‘atmosphere’ was in fact 
the driver of economic interactions, rather than their by-product: 
 
Economists often talk of the agglomeration of labour pools, firms, suppliers, 
and resources as producing an ensuing social environment where those 
involved in these different sectors engage each other in informal ways … But 
this informal social life that economists often hail as a successful by-product 
(what they call a positive spillover or externality) of an economic cluster is 
actually the central force, the raison d’être, for art and culture. The cultural 
economy is most efficient in the informal social realm and social dynamics 
underlie the economic system of cultural production. Creativity would not 
exist as successfully or efficiently without its social world –- the social is not 
the by-product –- it is the decisive mechanism by which cultural products and 
cultural producers are generated, evaluated and sent to the market (Currid, 
2007: 4 – emphasis added).  
 
This is due, at least in part, to the locus of innovation in such urban centres. In a 
traditional industrial district, it is the direct producers themselves who drive 
innovation, meaning that it typically involves innovations within an established field. 
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In large cities, there is a strong supportive infrastructure of providers of inputs and 
services to the creative industries, so that innovation is distributed more widely across 
the value chain. Global cities are, however, centres of greater consumer productivity, 
or more densely developed social network markets (Potts et. al., 2008), and places 
where the flows of knowledge, new information, and original products and ideas are 
most rapid. In this respect, global cities also benefit from populations that are 
typically both highly diverse – in terms of nationality, ethnicity, lifestyle, preferences 
etc. – and highly educated, so these local flows of knowledge tap into both global 
knowledge networks and circuits of global trade.   
 
The work of Potts et. al. (2008) on social network markets marks an application of 
new institutional and evolutionary economics, along with cultural and media studies, 
to defining the nature of the creative industries. The authors observe a familiar 
paradox that arises in defining the creative industries, namely that there is 
simultaneously an attempt to mark out particular sectors of production as being 
‘creative’, and a claim that the importance of creativity is manifesting itself across all 
spheres of economic life, and into social life and public policy. This paradox was 
discussed in Chapter One. In line with the move proposed by Hartley (2009), the 
argument is that the definition question in relation to creative industries needs to shift 
from production and outputs to markets and knowledge (Potts et. al., 2008: 168)  
 
Potts et. al. propose a definition of creative industries as ‘the set of agents in a market  
characterized by adoption of novel ideas within social networks for production and 
consumption’ (Potts et. al., 2008: 171). Critical to this definition are the concepts of 
social networks and novelty and adoption. While the rise of social networks has 
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become a general feature of 21st century Internet-enabled institutions and practices 
(Benkler, 2006), it is argued that they are particularly significant in the creative 
industries since these are domains of social life where the consumption choices of 
individuals are inherently shaped by the decisions and choices of others: ‘because of 
inherent novelty and uncertainty, decisions both to produce and to consume are 
determined by the choice of others in a social network’ (Potts et. al., 2008: 169). The 
ability to demonstrate choices and inform others of such decisions requires forms of 
social signaling, which may now be performed through socio-technical networks 
themselves (e.g. information circulated on Facebook or Twitter), but has also been 
flagged through fashion, subcultures, fads, trends etc., as Georg Simmel observed in 
relation to 1890s Berlin. Whether enabled by digital technologies, by the concentrated 
spaces of modern cities, or through news or entertainment media, the creative 
industries are thus very much reliant upon the social circulation of information: 
 
The CIs rely, to a greater extent than other socio-economic activity, on word 
of mouth, taste, cultures, and popularity, such that individual choices are 
dominated by information feedback over social networks rather than innate 
preferences and price signals … other people’s preferences have commodity 
status over a social network because novelty by definition carries uncertainty 
and other people’s choices, therefore, carry information (Potts et. al., 2008: 
170).  
 
Critical to the conception of creative industries in terms of social network markets, 
then, is to concept of novelty. What distinguishes creative industries from agriculture, 
manufacturing or professional services, in this definition, is not that they produce 
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intangibles, or are digital, or have more creative inputs; it is that their markets are 
always emergent, whereas these other sectors rely upon relatively mature markets and 
technologies (Potts et. al., 2008: 173). This is not to say that innovations from the 
creative industries do not spin off into these sectors, but that they typically do not 
have their origins in these sectors. A TV program such as the BBC’s Top Gear, for 
instance, would be a CI input to the automobile industry, as it marked out a novel way 
of conveying information relevant to consumers’ decisions to purchase cars, as well 
as being a form of entertainment television.  
 
Markets are critical here in that they constitute the institutional framework through 
which evolutionary processes can occur. Markets do not in themselves create novelty 
– novelty comes from those who choose to engage in such spaces with new ideas, 
concepts, products or services – but they do provide the content in which such novelty 
is tested through its uptake in the wider population, with the adoption and adaptation 
of successful new ideas, products etc., and the retention and replication of that which 
is successful, which may in turn be superceded in time by something else. Potts 
(2011: 162-183) has referred to novelty bundling markets as sites where this filtering 
occurs, which may include festivals, trade fairs, online information sites, the media, 
and so on. Competition is particularly important in this regard since it ‘underpins the 
operation and advance of the creative industries because, more than many industries, 
it depends upon the creation of continuous flows of novelty to meet consumer 




Can Urban Policy Promote Innovation? 
 
If cities can act as the catalyst of innovation, then can governments play a role in 
promoting innovative cities? The answer is that they can, but that the emergence of a 
city as creative or innovative often does not depend upon the actions of government. 
Many of the major music producing cities of the world, from Nashville to 
Manchester, acquired this status through broader demographic changes and the 
emergence of local music scenes whose development had little to do with 
government. By contrast, the rise of a city such as Seoul as a leader in digital media 
and creative industries has been connected – often indirectly – to the government’s 
commitment to making the city a global leader in high-speed broadband access, which 
ahs in turn acted as a catalyst of industries such as games development, mobile apps 
and mobile gaming. The rise of Hollywood was not directly due to any role played by 
government but, having become a global media capital, film and television production 
in Southern California has strong local and state government support. We can also 
note the role played by the universities as an essential part of the networks and “soft 
infrastructure” of major cities with strong media and creative industries. 
 
Having observed that governments can promote an innovation culture in cities, there 
is of course the question of how this may occur. The two major approaches that have 
been applied in recent times are the creative clusters approach, and the creative cities 
approach. Other terms used in the extensive literature on clusters are industrial 
districts, learning regions, and ‘sticky places’ (Markusen, 2008), in that their 
competitiveness in a global economy derives from what Michael Storper (1997) has 
termed untraded interdependencies, or ‘the conventions, informal rules, and habits 
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that coordinate economic actors under conditions of uncertainty … [and] constitute 
region-specific assets’ (Storper, 1997: 4-5). Such factors are seen as particularly 
conducive to innovation, both in the sense of developing new ideas of value to the 
industry, and disseminating these new ideas among relevant knowledge communities.  
 
Features of such successful clusters typically include: 
 
• Dense networks of small, locally-owned firms; 
• Low barriers to entry and exit for new firms; 
• Established relations of trust and reciprocity among buyers and suppliers 
across the value chain; 
• An institutional infrastructure that promotes knowledge sharing among 
participants (e.g. a local university may play a key brokering role, or a 
regional business association); 
• Strong movements of skilled people into the region, with low levels of out-
migration; 
• Specialist sources of finance, technical expertise and business services in the 
city or region; 
• Strong local government that is supportive of industry cluster while 
maintaining good governance practices.  
 
Such factors are seen as particularly conducive to innovation, both in the sense of 
developing new ideas of value to the industry, and disseminating these new ideas 
among relevant knowledge communities. One feature of successful clusters is their 
combination of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ infrastructure. Landry (2000: 133) observes that 
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while the ‘hard infrastructure’ includes buildings, institutions, transport facilities, 
communications infrastructure etc., the less tangible and more place-specific ‘soft 
infrastructure’ includes ‘the system of associative structures and social networks, 
connections and human interactions, that underpins and encourages the flow of ideas 
between individuals and institutions’.  
 
In observing some limitations to creative cluster strategies, it can be noted that 
‘cluster theory … is an entirely convincing post facto analysis … but rather more 
problematic as a prescriptive or diagnostic tool’ (Frith et. al., 2009: 79). Part of the 
problem arises in the propensity to conflate various elements of clustering, such as the 
co-location of industries in a particular place on the one hand, and the embedded 
social networks and knowledge transfer that epitomize dynamic industry clusters. As 
Gordon and McCann (2001) point out, agglomeration of similar firms in a particular 
place does not in itself demonstrate the positive effects of clustering; for example, 
warehousing facilities have long been clustered near ports and airports, but this is 
does not give such places the attributes of a Silicon Valley or a Hollywood. Another 
risk of creative cluster strategies is that they become overly genericized, and driven 
by civic boosterism and property development opportunities, rather than tapping into 
genuine mainsprings of local culture and creativity (Oakley, 2004; Mommaas, 2009). 
Finally, there is the risk of clusters becoming victims of their own success, generating 
a ‘groupthink’ that is insufficiently responsive to new ideas generated from outside of 
that milieu. The point has been made point that the fabled ‘tacit knowledge’ that exists 
within Hollywood about what audiences want from entertainment can be seen as 
resulting in ‘recycled creativity’ and formulaic, risk-averse cinema and TV product 
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that can be at odds with the development of more creative products that appeal to 
more diverse audiences (DePropris and Hypponen, 2008: 275-281).  
 
The general problem with cluster theories is the absence of a theory of consumer 
demand. Global cities also benefit from populations that are typically both highly 
diverse – in terms of nationality, ethnicity, lifestyle, preferences etc. – and highly 
educated, so these local flows of knowledge tap into both global knowledge networks 
and circuits of global trade.  But these are not factors directly created by governments 
simply by putting related industries together through officially sanctioned creative 
clusters. They come from the culture of a city: its diversity, openness to new ideas, 
and preparedness to invest in new innovations. The creative cluster movement in its 
current form is, I would argue, currently too governmentalised, and overly prone to 
seeing investment in a creative cluster as an end in itself, rather than being part of an 
ongoing process in developing dense social network markets in a city or region. 
 
In this respect, Peter Hall’s observation that ‘having creative industries is not at all the 
same thing as being creative’ (Hall, 2000: 642), and the critical question for 
researchers to address is ‘whether a city can have creative industries for very long 
without being creative’. A creative city strategy has been defined by the Australian 
cultural economist David Throsby in these terms:  
 
The concept of a ‘creative city’ describes an urban complex where cultural 
activities of various sorts are an integral component of the city’s economic and 
social functioning. Such cities tend to be built upon a strong social and 
cultural infrastructure; to have relatively high concentrations of creative 
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employment; and to be attractive to inward investment because of their well-
established arts and cultural facilities … A creative city strategy will pay 
attention to cultural infrastructure, local cultural participation and involvement, 
the development of a flourishing and dynamic creative arts sector, community-
oriented heritage conservation, and support for wider creative industries that 
are fully integrated into the local economy (Throsby, 2010: 139-140).  
 
Creative city strategies have been taken up around the world, and particularly in the 
fast-developing cities of East Asia (Yusuf and Nabeshima, 2005; Gibson and Kong, 
2005). But just as the cluster script has been overly prone to focus on production, 
critics argue that this is very much a consumption-led urban strategy that loses sight 
of the complex production ecologies that form the basis for city-based creative 
clusters (Pratt, 2008). The argument also became highly genericized, and open to the 
criticism made by Oakley (2004) of promoting a ‘cookie-cutter’ approach to urban 
cultural development: the image of the bike-wielding urban hipster and/or gay artist 
seeking intense urban experiences quickly moved from archetype to cliché when it 
translated to urban cultural policy. Moreover, it is far from clear that artists and other 
creative workers, rather than urban professionals in a more general sense, are the 
beneficiaries of such strategies. Insofar as they promote gentrification of inner cities, 
their effect may well be to drive out artists, musicians and others engaged in cultural 
activities who are unable to afford rising property prices, thereby threatening to kill 
off the creative milieu that gave rise to creative city strategies in the first place.  
 
Creative city strategies stress the role played by amenities in promoting urban growth. 
Storper and Scott (2009) identify other variants of amenity-based urban growth 
 23 
theories, including those emphasising the natural attributes of cities (sunshine, warm 
winters), diverse entertainment opportunities, and cultural facilities. They conclude 
that such consumption-based theories of cities fail to identify the ‘important forces 
endogenous to urban growth’ (Storper and Scott, 2009: 153), most particularly the 
relationship between inter-firm networks, local labour markets and the institutional 
frameworks supporting innovation and coordination that exist in such cities. Their 
argument is that more prosperous cities will be able to provide a higher level of 
cultural and other forms of amenity, and hence will be attractive places to migrate to, 
but that it is the relationship between production and consumption that prevails in the 
city itself that drives its future growth trajectory. It may be argued, then, that creative 
city theory both overstates the mobility of ‘creative class’ workers – particularly by 
conflating well-paid managers and professionals with less well-paid artists and other 
creative workers – and understates the significance of production networks to the 
success of cities. It would follow that, however desirable cultural amenities are to 
those who live in cities, they will not in and of themselves drive the economic 
performance of those cities. As a result, investing in cultural amenities by urban 
policy-makers in order to achieve a turnaround in a city’s economic performance is 
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